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RECENT DECISIONS

JUDICATA-LIMITATION

OF CALIFORNIA

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN MULTIPLE CLAIMANT

DOCTRINE

OF

CASES-Plaintiffs were in-

jured when their car was struck by defendant. They commenced separate
negligence actions, which were consolidated for trial. These actions resulted
in a judgment for plaintiff son, but judgments were entered against the
plaintiffs mother and father. These parties were granted a new trial, with rio
limitation upon the issues to be tried. On the second trial the parents asserted the son's judgment, which had become final and been satisfied, as
conclusively establishing defendant's negligence. The trial court ruled
against them and submitted the issue of defendant's negligence to the jury.
On appeal by the parents, held, affirmed. Collateral estoppel does not apply
to claims of different persons arising from a single accident. To recover,
each claimant must establish the defendant's liability unaided by judgments rendered in favor of other claimants. Nevarov v. Caldwell, (Cal. App.
1958) 327 P. (2d) 111.
The common statement of the doctrine of collateral estoppel' is that an
issue has been conclusively determined between parties where it has been
necessarily determined by a final judgment in a previous action between
the same parties or their privies. 2 Implicit in this statement is the requirement of mutuality-that the party pleading the former judgment and the
party against whom it is asserted must have been parties or privies to the
former action.3 Since the facts of this case do not bring it within a recognized exception to the general rule,4 plaintiffs' plea would normally be defeated on the ground of lack of mutuality.5 Plaintiffs, however, relied on the
'United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S.
351 (1876); comment, 65 H.Mv. L. Rxv. 818 at 840 (1952).
2 Privity is defined in 1 JUDGMENTs REsTATEmENT §§87-92 (1942).
3 Hornstein v. Kramer Brothers Freight Lines, (3d Cir. 1948) 135 F. (2d) 145; comment, 65 HARv. L. Rxv. 818 at 855 (1952).
4Exceptions are made in cases involving derivative' liability, master and servant
relationship, and indemnitor-indemnitee situations. Elder v. New York and Pennsylvania
Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 550, 31 N.E. (2d) 188 (1940); Good Health Dairy Products
Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E. (2d) 758 (1937); Brobston v. Darby Borough, 290
Pa. 331, 138 A. 849 (1927).
5 See 133 A.L.R. 181 at 185 (1941).
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decision in-Bernhardv. Bank of America,6 which purported to abolish the
mutuality requirement in California. It was stated in the Bernhard case
that a litigant not a party to a former action could plead a final judgment
in the former action as an estoppel on an issue there determined against any
litigant who was a party or privy thereto. 7 This statement appears broad
enough to sanction the offensive use of a former judgment in cases arising
from a single accident, 8 although the Bernhard case only involved the de9
fensive use of a former judgment. As predicted, the court in the instant

case concluded that the Bernhard case did not require such a result. The

principal reason advanced was that application of an estoppel in favor of
10
multiple-claimants would place the defendant at a perilous disadvantage.
No..victory or number of victories would permit him to assert a favorable
judgment against succeeding claimants, but one "aberrational verdict""
against him would be given standing as ultimate truth and preclude him in
subsequent cases. This would mean that a defendant must litigate to his
utmost against every claimant, including those having insignificant claims
12
not worth contesting. With the exception of one commentator, no support
can be found for such an anomalous result. The "aberrational verdict"
-problem is particularly significant because in many instances the defendant
3
is-.unable to require a joinder of claimants.' It is questionable whether
-the same reasoning should apply to a situation like that in the principal
case where there has been a successful joinder or a consolidation for trial.
In this situation there is no possibility that one "aberrational verdict" in
a series may be used by a subsequent plaintiff who was not involved in the
action in which that verdict was rendered. Where defendant has faced all
potential claimants in the first trial, it-would seem reasonable to hold that

6 19 Cal. (2d) 807, 122 P. (2d) 892 (1942).
T See Bernhard v. Bank of America, note 6 supra, at 812.
8 Note, 57 HARv. L. Ray. 98 (1943); Currie, "Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits
of the Bernhard Doctrine," 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957).
9 Note, 57 HA1v. L. REv. 98 (1943); Polasky, "Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior
Litigation," 39 IowA L. REv. 217 (1954); Currie, "Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits
of -the Bernhard Doctrine," 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957).
10 The court also stated that application of an estoppel would promote vexatious
litigation by requiring the defendant to appeal the insignificant judgment in favor of
the son in order to keep the issue of his negligence open on the second trial. Yet failure
& apply the' estoppel has required relitigation of the issue of defendant's negligence
on the second trial. In short the problem presented by this case is not solved by the
policy of putting litigation to an end.
-11 The term is coined by Currie to describe the one imperfect verdict that a jury
may render against a defendant, after he has successfully defended against several plaintiffs on the same issues. Currie, "Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine," 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957).
12 Von Moschzisker, "Res Judicata," 38 YALE L. J. 299 at 303 (1929).
1 This is generally the result of jurisdictional difficulties. See the discussion by
'3
Currie, "Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine," 9 STAN. L.
Ray. 281 at 287 (1957).
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he has had his day in court on the issues involved, and that he may not
again litigate them in the event that new trials are granted some of the
plaintiffs.
Even if this rationale were accepted, however, an alternative justification for the result in the principal case might be based on a recognition
of the distinction between offensive and defensive uses of collateral estoppel. 14 Within certain limits, the plaintiff's control over the time and place
of trial may be of great advantage. It may then be reasonable, in a second
action by a losing plaintiff, to allow the subsequent defendant to make
defensive use of the prior judgment. This was essentially the situation in
the Bernhard case. On the other hand it may well be unfair to permit a
subsequent plaintiff offensively to use a prior judgment against a losing
defendant where the prior trial took place in a judicial climate relatively
unfavorable to the defendant. This reasoning diminishes in force, however,
if the court in the second action should determine that the losing defendant
was not at a disadvantage in the earlier litigation. Since the instant case
is silent on this point, it is questionable whether this theory can be considered a valid ground for its decision. In any event, the principal case has
made a significant contribution to California law by declaring the policy
that collateral estoppel does not apply in favor of multiple claims arising
from a single accident.
Sidney B. Hopps

14The distinction between offensive and defensive uses of collateral estoppel is
discussed by Currie, "Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,"
9 STAN. L. REV. 281 at 289 (1957); and by Polasky, "Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior
Litigation," 39 IowA L. RAy. 217 at 246 (1954).

